

30 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Organization of DD/R

REFERENCE : DCI's Memorandum of 24 July 1963

1. I have studied and thought about the Director's memorandum of 24 July on the organization of DD/R and I can readily understand his misgivings, particularly based upon the comments which he has been receiving from various parts of the Agency opposing any changes. I too would strenuously oppose change for change's sake, or even solely for accommodation of an individual, but I believe that the changes currently proposed are valid, objective and should be made for the good of the Agency. In this I would admit that I have changed my views in the last year and a half, but I am not apologizing for a change in views because I think that certain developments warrant these changes.

2. As the Director points out, his original concept, which he discussed at length with the Kirkpatrick-Coyne-Schuyler Board and myself, the President's Board and Congressional Committees, was to pull together all scientific and technical talents. It is true that the study group opposed taking OSI out of the DD/I because it felt that there was a greater identity of interest for the type of personnel concerned in the DD/I area than there would be in the DD/R. As far as TSD was concerned, General Schuyler and myself did not feel that all of TSD should go to DD/R; Coyne felt that it should. On the other hand, neither General Schuyler nor myself were as convinced that the R&D part of TSD shouldn't go to DD/R and indeed we urged that DD/R and DD/P negotiate over this section.

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
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
3. The changes proposed today will not in my opinion lessen in any manner the effectiveness of the Agency, and may indeed greatly increase it. I am convinced that the DD/R will insure that the DD/I gets as good or even better cooperation and service from OSI in estimates and current intelligence and other aspects of intelligence production requiring the integration of various intelligence disciplines. As a balance sheet on the transfer I would list the following factors.

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Con:

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- a. OSI is composed largely of intelligence analysts who should remain in an area where the bulk of the personnel are analysts.
 - b. There is greater identity of interest between the background of the OSI analysts - heavily PHDs - to the DD/I than there would be to the DD/R - heavily operators (at the moment).
 - c. Keeping OSI in DD/I enables a greater integration of intelligence production.
 - d. Cline makes the argument that he needs OSI to "keep DIA honest".
 - e. Cline makes the argument that the system can work effectively only if he has everything under his command in the intelligence research and analytical field.

Pro:

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- a. The argument that the analysts should be in DD/I because that is where all of the other analysts are falls apart if we look at a broader picture than just the Agency alone. There are and always will be analysts in both State and DIA, and it is part of the DCI's responsibility to produce coordinated and integrated intelligence which transcends CIA alone. The DD/I must therefore, and very importantly should, depend heavily on State and DIA for contributions in their specialties. The fact that he will have to depend upon another component of CIA doesn't in any way lessen his capability for doing his job.
 - b. The argument that there is a greater affinity between the PHDs in OSI and those in DD/I is completely negated by the fact that we hope to attract to DD/R, R & D, some of the finest scientific brains in the country - hopefully as many PHDs as possible. Further, I am now much more persuaded by the "Lodestone Theory" or, as the scientists would put it, "having a hard nucleus to attract others".
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c. As far as integration of intelligence, I find little argument to persuade me of the fact that it can be better integrated if everybody is in DD/I. Despite difficulties, we seem to have been able to integrate intelligence with DIA, and with good will on both sides I see no real problem in this regard.

d. The argument about "keeping DIA honest" appalls me somewhat because my immediate reaction is "who keeps CIA honest?" While I do agree that we should have sufficient expertise to insure the DCI that his other constituents, e. g. DIA, NSA and State, are producing competent intelligence, I think the mere attitude expressed in this comment is unfortunate. Further, if it is valid I see no reason why it can't be done just as well in DD/R as in DD/I.

e. Concerning the argument that the system can work effectively only if he has everything under his command, the DD/I does not have everything under his command today. He doesn't have the DIA or State contributions under his command. He indeed doesn't have all CIA intelligence production and analysis under his command. There is considerable work in this field in the DD/P, such as that of the International Communism Division in CI Staff and that of some of the area divisions.

25X1 4. Thus in answer to the Director's question, I do believe that he can be absolutely sure that the support of the DD/I will be continuous, timely and uninterrupted under all circumstances and that there will be proper integration of technical intelligence with economic and political opinions. I would add to this further that the arguments against any change in DD/I are just as invalid to me as would be arguments to the effect that we ought to have all of the lawyers in the Agency in one area because they all have LLBs. I would doubt very much if the Harvard faculty would entertain for one moment combining the Department of History with that of Physics because they all have Doctorates. They are separate disciplines with separate philosophies and yet they work together as separate departments. Further, the present DD/I plans to break up OSI would further fragment our scientific and technical effort rather than giving it greater emphasis, and I am sure would result in a reduction in the quality of our scientific effort inasmuch as they would inevitably be submerged to the "generalists" in DD/I rather than being kept under scientific specialists. Another compelling argument is the much greater input we are getting from the scientific and technical side of the house now that Wheelon has been attending the morning meetings, and I am impressed by the fact that his presence not only adds to the breadth of analysis that we receive, but I am sure also tends to keep this particular "game honest". I am impressed by the fact that we did not have that type of input before his attendance. Two other brief comments. I would point out that in the 40's CIA had an Office of Research and Estimates which included all of the functions now

depth to feel that what he proposes is the best way to do the job, and I am confident that it will succeed. I naturally assume that our senior officers are all of sufficient breadth and quality so that we can assume there will be the necessary good will and cooperation to insure the success in any decision made.

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Zyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director